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Abstract
We investigate moral-hazard problems with limited liability where agents have
expectation-based reference-dependent preferences. We show that stochastic compen-
sation for low performance can be optimal. Because of loss aversion, the agents have
ﬁrst-order risk aversion to wage uncertainty. This causes the agents to work harder
when their low performance is stochastically compensated. We also examine team in-
centives for credibly employing such stochastic compensation. In an optimal contract,
low- and high-performance agents are equally rewarded if most agents achieve high
performance. Team incentives can be optimal even when there are only two agents and
the degree of loss aversion is not large.
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1 Introduction
How a principal encourages an agent to work hard is one of the main themes in organizational
economics. The main insight of the literature on moral-hazard problems is that the principal
pays a high wage to the agent if and only if his performance is high.1 In practice, however,
ﬁrms often pay bonuses to low-performance agents as well as high-performance ones. Recent
empirical studies on executive compensation show that CEOs are often paid for luck as well
as their performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Garvey and Milbourn 2006). To
explain why ﬁrms sometimes reward both low- and high-performance agents, we focus on a
prominent behavioral aspect, loss aversion: people are more sensitive to losses than to same-
sized gains. We investigate a moral-hazard model with limited liability in which an agent
exhibits expectation-based loss aversion a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Because the
agent has ﬁrst-order risk aversion to wage uncertainty, the principal can reduce the agent’s
feeling of losses if she stochastically compensates for his low performance. This generates
a new trade-oﬀ on the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint, which leads to stochastic
compensation as an optimal contract: an agent is always rewarded when his performance is
high, and he is stochastically rewarded when his performance is low.
The agent’s utility consists of intrinsic consumption utility and psychological gain-loss
utility deﬁned as the diﬀerence between his realized outcome and his reference point. The
agent is loss averse in both the wage dimension and the eﬀort-cost dimension, and his ref-
erence point is determined by his recent expectations regarding his wage and eﬀort cost.
For example, suppose that an agent expects to work hard and to receive either $0 or $30
with equal probabilities. Suppose that he actually works hard. In the wage dimension, his
expected gain-loss utility consists of a weighted average of the following four cases with equal
weights. There is no gain-loss in two cases: he expects to receive $0 and actually receives
$0, and he expects to receive $30 and actually receives $30. The agent feels a loss of $30 in
the case where he expects to receive $30 but actually receives $0. Similarly, the agent feels a
gain of $30 in the case where he expects to receive $0 but actually receives $30. Because the
agent is loss averse, his feeling of a $30 loss looms larger than that of a $30 gain. Therefore,
his expected gain-loss utility for wage is negative and represents his aversion to wage uncer-
tainty. In the eﬀort-cost dimension, he feels neither gains nor losses because he expects to
work hard and actually works hard.
To determine the agent’s reference points endogenously, we assume that the agent’s
1We use male pronouns to refer to the agent and female pronouns to refer to the principal.
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reference points are determined by his rational expectations and that his expectations are
updated according to his chosen action before the outcome is realized. Because the agent
correctly anticipates that his belief will be adapted to his chosen action, he takes this into
account when he chooses his action. This solution concept is called the choice-acclimating
personal equilibrium (CPE), which is introduced by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007). CPE is
plausible when the action is determined long before the outcome is realized, and hence the
agent’s belief is acclimated before he observes the actual outcome.
We ﬁrst analyze a single-agent moral-hazard model with limited liability and derive
the optimal contract. We highlight a key trade-oﬀ between the standard-incentive eﬀect
in the intrinsic utility and the loss-reducing eﬀect in the gain-loss utility on the agent’s
incentive compatibility constraint. On the one hand, the standard-incentive eﬀect leads an
agent to work less under stochastic compensation than under non-stochastic compensation
because rewarding for the agent’s low performance weakens his incentive to work hard. On
the other hand, the loss-reducing eﬀect can lead the agent to work more under stochastic
compensation because (i) the principal can reduce the agent’s expected loss when he works
hard and (ii) she can increase his expected loss when he works less. Hence, regarding the
gain-loss utility, the agent works more by stochastic compensation for his low performance.
As a result, stochastic compensation is optimal when the loss-reducing eﬀect outweighs the
standard-incentive eﬀect. Stochastic compensation is more likely to be adopted when the
probability of success in the project is small. We also show that the stochastic compensation
is optimal even when we additionally impose an individual rationality constraint as well as
the limited liability constraint. Speciﬁcally, if stochastic compensation is optimal when we
do not impose the individual rationality constraint, then—irrespective of the level of the
agent’s reservation utility—stochastic compensation is still optimal even when we impose
such a constraint. Importantly, the principal only partially compensates for the agent’s
low performance in the optimal contract. This is because if she compensates for his low
performance almost surely, then the standard-incentive eﬀect dominates the loss-reducing
eﬀect.
Even when the principal would like to adopt stochastic compensation, how she can cred-
ibly commit to such a scheme is an important issue in practice. By applying our insight to
multi-agent moral-hazard problems, we show that the principal adopts a team-based incen-
tive scheme even when each agent’s probability of success in a project is independent. In
the optimal contract, the principal rewards both high- and low-performance agents equally if
most agents accomplish their projects; otherwise she rewards only high-performance agents.
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Furthermore, such a team-based incentive scheme—based on joint performance evaluation—
arises even when the principal hires only two agents and the degree of loss aversion is not
large. Our result on team incentives helps explain why sometimes low-performance employ-
ees are rewarded as well as high-performance ones, especially when a company makes high
proﬁts.
The study most closely related to ours is Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), who
analyze a single-agent moral-hazard model where the agent is loss averse. Their main ﬁnding
is that the optimal contract is a binary bonus scheme even under a rich performance mea-
sure. They also show that even when the principal faces an implementation problem under
non-stochastic wage schemes as ﬁrst pointed out by Daido and Itoh (2007), the principal
can still induce the agent to take the desired action if she compensates for the agent’s low
performance. By imposing the individual rationality constraint but not imposing the limited
liability constraint, Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) show that the principal wants
to compensate for the agent’s low performance almost surely if the agent is suﬃciently loss
averse; otherwise, she never compensates for the agent’s low performance. Although their
result is prominent, two sensitive issues arise. First, in their model the optimal compen-
sation probability for low performance approaches one, and hence the optimal contract is
not well-deﬁned. Second, the optimal wage received by the agent for low performance goes
to negative inﬁnity. In contrast, by imposing the limited liability constraint we shed light
on a new trade-oﬀ between the standard-incentive eﬀect and the loss-reducing eﬀect on the
incentive compatibility constraint. With focusing on the trade-oﬀ, we extensively analyze
the properties of stochastic compensation and derive a new insight for team incentives.
Some recent literature also applies expectation-based reference-dependent preferences to
moral-hazard problems.2 Daido and Itoh (2007) examine a single-agent model with limited
liability and study the Pygmalion and Galatea eﬀects as self-fulﬁlling prophecies. Gill and
Stone (2010) analyze a rank-order tournament under agent loss aversion.3 Macera (2011)
extends Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2009) dynamic loss aversion model to a repeated moral-hazard
situation and studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives.
Recent empirical and experimental research ﬁnds the importance of expectation-based
reference-dependent preferences. Crawford and Meng (2011) estimate cab drivers’ labor
2For the literature which applies expectation-based reference-dependent preferences to other problems,
see Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008), Lange and Ratan (2010) and Herweg and Mierendorﬀ (2013).
3In Gill and Stone (2011), they analyze a team production problem in which the output is equally shared
among agents. They examine how the agents’ reference points, which are diﬀerent from CPE, aﬀect the
agents’ equilibrium eﬀorts.
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supply decisions based on the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), and reconcile the ﬁndings
between Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997) and Farber (2005, 2008). Fehr
and Goette (2007) conduct a randomized ﬁeld experiment among bike messengers, and ﬁnd
that loss aversion explains well the labor-supply decisions of the bike messengers. Abeler,
Falk, Goette, and Huﬀman (2011) design a real-eﬀort experiment in which the subjects choose
how long they work on a simple repetitive task. They conﬁrm the validity of expectation-
based reference-dependent preferences; the higher the subjects’ expectations are, the longer
they work and the more they earn. Gill and Prowse (2012) conduct real-eﬀort sequential-
move tournament experiments. Their results are consistent with the theoretical prediction
of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences under CPE.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and explains
the concept of CPE. Section 3 analyzes the optimal wage schemes in a single-agent model.
Section 4 examines the multi-agent moral-hazard problems and shows that a principal may
adopt team-based incentive schemes. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are provided in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
Suppose the following moral-hazard model in which a risk-neutral principal hires an agent.
The agent makes a binary-eﬀort decision a ∈ {0, 1} at the cost of d · a where d > 0. Actions
a = 1 and a = 0 mean that the agent works and shirks, respectively. The performance of
the agent is either high or low, which is denoted by Q ∈ {H,L}. The probability of realizing
Q = H is q1 if a = 1 and q0 if a = 0, where 0 ≤ q0 < q1 < 1. Let Δq ≡ q1 − q0. The agent is
subject to limited liability. To highlight the main results in a simple manner, we now assume
away the agent’s individual rationality constraint; we analyze the model with the individual
rationality constraint in Section 3.4.
Wage payment schemes from the principal to the agent can depend on the performance of
the agent and the outcome of a lottery. To analyze the possibility of stochastic compensation,
suppose that before setting the wage levels the principal can use and commit to any kind of
a ﬁnite-outcome lottery.4 Let n ∈ {1, · · · , N} be the outcome of the reduced lottery with
associated probability pn > 0; for any given two lotteries, we can construct a new lottery.
The wage vector for the agent can be expressed asw ≡ (wH1, · · · , wHN ;wL1, · · · , wLN) where
wQn ≥ 0 is the wage when the performance of the agent is Q and the outcome of the lottery
4Section 4 analyzes a multi-agent model where the principal can adopt a team-based incentive scheme in
order to credibly commit to such stochastic compensation.
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is n. The agent’s expected wage under w is represented by
π(a,w) =
N∑
n=1
pn[qawHn + (1− qa)wLn].
A key assumption of our model is that the agent’s overall utility consists of intrinsic
consumption utility and psychological gain-loss utility. We assume that each agent has
expectation-based reference-dependent preferences a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). In
our model, the agent has two consumption dimensions: eﬀort cost and wage. For each
consumption dimension, the agent feels psychological gain-loss by comparing his realized
outcome with his reference outcomes. We assume that the agent has the same gain-loss
function for each consumption dimension. For deterministic reference point cases, let the
agent’s reference point for his eﬀort and his wage be aˆ and wˆ, respectively. If he actually
exerts eﬀort a and receives wage w, his overall utility is
w − ad+ μ(w − wˆ) + μ(−ad+ aˆd),
where μ(·) is a gain-loss function that satisﬁes the assumptions introduced by Bowman et
al. (1999), which correspond to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) value function. In what
follows, we assume that μ(·) is piecewise linear in order to focus on the eﬀect of loss aversion.
Then, when the consumption is x and reference point is r, we can simply deﬁne the gain-loss
function as
μ(x− r) =
{
η(x− r) if x− r ≥ 0,
ηλ(x− r) if x− r < 0.
where η ≥ 0 represents the weight on the gain-loss payoﬀ, and λ ≥ 1 is the degree of the loss
aversion.
Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume that the reference point is deter-
mined by rational beliefs about outcomes and that the reference point itself is stochastic if
the outcome is stochastic. The agent feels gain-loss by comparing each possible outcome
with every reference point. For example, suppose that an agent with η > 0 and λ > 1
had been expecting to receive $100, $150, or $200 with equal probabilities. If he actually
receives $150, then he feels a gain of $50 relative to $100, no gain-loss relative to $150 and
a psychological loss of $50 relative to $200. Because the loss of $50 looms larger than the
gain of $50, his gain-loss utility is negative in this case.
Note that the agent’s expected intrinsic utility is π(a,w) − ad. To deﬁne the expected
gain-loss utility formally, let aˆ be the agent’s reference point for his own eﬀort decision. That
is, aˆ represents the agent’s belief of the action he will choose. Similarly, denote wˆ as the
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agent’s reference wage based on aˆ. Then, the agent’s expected gain-loss utility in the wage
dimension is
π(a,w|aˆ, wˆ) ≡
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
pnpm
[
qaqaˆμ(wHn − wˆHm) + (1− qa)qaˆμ(wLn − wˆHm)
+ qa(1− qaˆ)μ(wHn − wˆLm) + (1− qa)(1− qaˆ)μ(wLn − wˆLm)
]
, (1)
and the agent’s expected gain-loss utility in the eﬀort-cost dimension is μ(−ad + aˆd). To
explain Equation (1) clearly, suppose that the agent expects that the outcome of the lottery
is m, but the actual outcome is n with probability pnpm. When the agent expects to succeed
with probability qaˆ, he compares his reference wage wˆHm to his actual wage for success wHn
(resp. for failure wLn) with probability qaqaˆ (resp. (1 − qa)qaˆ). Conversely, when the agent
expects to fail with probability 1−qaˆ, he compares his reference wage wˆLm to his actual wage
wHn (resp. wLn) with probability qa(1 − qaˆ) (resp. (1 − qa)(1 − qaˆ)). The agent’s expected
overall utility is denoted by
U(a,w|aˆ, wˆ) ≡ π(a,w)− ad+ π(a,w|aˆ, wˆ) + μ(−ad+ aˆd).
We derive the optimal wage schemes according to the equilibrium concept deﬁned by
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007): the choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE). Under CPE,
the agent’s reference point is acclimated to the action taken by him. This is plausible when
the action is determined long before the outcome and payment occur, and hence he updates
his belief to the action he took before the outcome is realized. Because the agent knows
that his belief will change on the basis of his chosen action before the outcome and payment
occur, he takes this change into account when he decides what action to take. Therefore,
each agent’s action itself determines his reference point under CPE, and the condition to
choose working under CPE is represented by
U(1,w|1,w) ≥ U(0,w|0,w). (CPE-IC)
(CPE-IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint under CPE: the agent’s overall utility
when his reference action is 1 and he actually chooses 1 is greater than or equal to that when
his reference is 0 and he actually chooses 0.
The timing is as follows:
1. The principal picks up a lottery that can be tied to a wage payment scheme.
2. The principal oﬀers a wage payment scheme subject to the limited liability.
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3. The agent chooses his action.
4. The performance signal and the outcome of the lottery are realized, and the wage is
paid.
3 The Optimal Wage Scheme
This section analyzes the optimal wage schemes in the model described in Section 2. Note
that if the principal wants to implement low eﬀort, then setting wQn = 0 for all Q and n is
obviously the optimal wage scheme even under agent loss aversion. Therefore, throughout
this paper, we assume that the project is so valuable that the principal wants to make the
agent work. In what follows, we set wHn ≥ wHn′ for any n ≥ n′ without loss of generality.
3.1 The Optimal Contract without Loss Aversion
First, we examine a benchmark case in which an agent is not loss-averse before analyzing
the optimal wage scheme under agent loss aversion. Given a lottery, the principal’s problem
is to minimize her expected payment given that the agent works as follows:
min
w
N∑
n=1
pn[q1wHn + (1− q1)wLn]
subject to
N∑
n=1
pn(wHn − wLn) ≥ d
Δq
, (IC)
wQn ≥ 0 for all Q, n, (LL)
where (IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint to induce the agents to exert high eﬀort,
and (LL) is the limited liability constraint. Because the left hand side of (IC) is decreasing
in wLn, the optimal contract scheme satisﬁes wLn = 0 for all n. To minimize the expected
payment, the principal reduces wHn to hold (IC) with equality. As a result, any wage scheme
that satisﬁes wLn = 0 for any n and (IC) with equality is optimal.
To conﬁrm the robustness of the result, we also examine an alternative case where an
agent is risk averse. Suppose that the agent has a utility function m(·) in the wage dimension
such that m(0) = 0, m(·) is twice diﬀerentiable, m′(·) > 0 and m′′(·) < 0. Then, (IC) is
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replaced by:
N∑
n=1
pn (m(wHn)−m(wLn)) ≥ d
Δq
. (IC’)
Note that the left hand side of (IC’) is still decreasing in wLn. Because m(·) is strictly
concave, wHn is constant across n in the optimal contract. Hence, the unique optimal wage
scheme speciﬁes that wHn = m
−1
(
d
Δq
)
> 0 and wLn = 0 for all n. These results are
summarized as follows:
Proposition 1. Suppose an agent is not loss averse (λ = 1). Then, a non-stochastic com-
pensation scheme is optimal.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that a non-stochastic compensation scheme (N = 1) is always
optimal under standard concave utility.
3.2 The Optimal Contract with Loss Aversion
Now we examine the optimal wage schemes under agent loss-aversion. We ﬁrst show that if
the principal can use only non-stochastic compensation (N = 1), then high eﬀort may not
be implementable. In this case, π(a,w|a,w) = −qa(1 − qa)η(λ − 1)|wH − wL|. Note that
−q1(1− q1) + q0(1− q0) = −Δq(1− q0 − q1). Hence, the principal’s problem is represented
by
min
wH ,wL≥0
q1wH + (1− q1)wL
s.t. wH − wL − (1− q0 − q1)η(λ− 1)|wH − wL| ≥ d
Δq
, (2)
where (2) is the CPE-IC condition in this case. Notice that if (1− q0− q1)η(λ− 1) ≥ 1, then
(2) is never satisﬁed.
Proposition 2. Suppose (1 − q0 − q1)η(λ − 1) ≥ 1. Then, high eﬀort (a = 1) is not
implementable by any non-stochastic compensation scheme.
The implementation problem in Proposition 2 is ﬁrst pointed out by Daido and Itoh
(2007) and is examined by Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010). Intuitively, when the
degree of loss aversion is not small and the probability of success in the project is small, the
agent is more likely to suﬀer from losses because it is diﬃcult to achieve his project even if
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he works hard. In order to make the agent work hard, the principal needs to alleviate his
feeling of losses; but she cannot do so without employing stochastic compensation.5
Even when high eﬀort is not implementable by non-stochastic incentive schemes, the
principal can induce the agent to work hard by stochastically compensating for the agent’s
failure. In the following analysis, we assume away negative-bonus wage schemes:
Assumption 1. wHn ≥ wLn for all n.
Assumption 1 holds for most wage schemes in practice. Notice that Assumption 1 is justiﬁed
if each agent can secretly dispose his output: the agent’s performance would deteriorate if
he prefers reporting low performance to reporting high performance.6
The next lemma shows that (i) the principal can always implement high eﬀort, (ii) the
agent receives a positive wage whenever he accomplishes his project, and (iii) the principal
oﬀers a binary payment scheme generically.
Lemma 1. (i) High eﬀort (a = 1) is implementable.
(ii) In the optimal wage scheme, wHn = w > 0 for all n.
(iii) A binary payment scheme is optimal: wLn ∈ {w,wL} for all n. Generically, it is the
unique optimal wage scheme.
Lemma 1 (i) shows that, as Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) point out, the prin-
cipal can always implement high eﬀort by stochastic compensation. In addition, Lemma 1
(ii) shows that the principal sets a positive constant wage when the agent accomplishes the
project. Intuitively, because the agent dislikes wage uncertainty, the principal can always
encourage him to work hard by paying a positive constant wage when the agent succeeds.
Lemma 1 (iii) comes from the fact that the principal’s problem becomes a linear programming
problem owing to the assumptions of linear consumption utility and piecewise-linear gain-
loss utility. Then, the problem has a unique solution at an extreme point of the constraint
set generically.7 Note that even when the agent’s performance is low, he may stochastically
receive the positive wage. In addition, the proof of Lemma 1 (iii) shows that wL = 0 holds
in the optimal contract when we do not impose the individual rationality constraint. In-
5Relatedly, Spiegler (2012) shows that if a principal does not face moral-hazard problems (without the
incentive compatibility constraint), in the optimal contract she randomizes the transfer to an agent in order
to relax the individual rationality constraint.
6See Innes (1990) and Matthews (2001) for the detailed discussion.
7This method is developed by Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010). In Section 3.5, we discuss the case
of which the agent’s consumption utility is concave.
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tuitively, if wL > 0 then the principal can reduce w and wL by the same amount without
violating constraints.8
Let α denote the probability of which the agent gets a positive wage when his performance
is low: α ≡ Prob(wQn = w|Q = L). The principal compensates for the agent’s failure with
this probability. We refer to α as the compensation rate. By Lemma 1, the principal’s
problem can be reduced to choose a wage w > 0 and a compensation probability α ∈ [0, 1]
so as to minimize her expected payment. In this setting, α = 0 means that the agent’s wage
depends only on his own outcome. On the other hand, α = 1 means full compensation: the
principal oﬀers a ﬂat-wage contract.
The principal’s problem becomes:
min
w>0,α∈[0,1]
[q1 + α(1− q1)]w
s.t. (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(SI)
w + (1− α)[1− (1− α)(2− q0 − q1)]η(λ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(LR)
w ≥ d
Δq
. (CPE-IC’)
(CPE-IC’) exhibits a sharp trade-oﬀ between standard-incentive eﬀect (SI) and the loss-
reducing eﬀect (LR). (SI) is derived from the intrinsic utility: increasing the compensation
rate α reduces the incentive to work hard. (LR) is derived from the gain-loss utility by
comparing a positive wage of w with a base wage of zero. This means increasing the com-
pensation rate α encourages the agent to work hard because it reduces wage uncertainty
when working, provided α is not too large.9 Notice that (SI) does not depend both on η and
λ, while the eﬀect of (LR) increases as η or λ increases. Hence, in contrast to the concave
utility case, if the agent is loss averse, he is more likely to work hard when his low perfor-
mance is stochastically compensated (α > 0) than when low performance always leads to a
low wage (α = 0). Furthermore, full compensation (α = 1) is never optimal because it does
not satisfy (CPE-IC’). Also, if α = 0, then (CPE-IC’) is equivalent to (2) with wL = 0.
Because (CPE-IC’) holds with equality in the optimal contract, the optimal amount of
w is determined as a function of α:
w(α) ≡ d
Δq(1− α){1 + [1− (1− α)(2− q1 − q0)]η(λ− 1)} .
By plugging w(α) into the objective function and solving it, we characterize the optimal
wage schemes as follows:
8Note that wL in the optimal contract may be positive if we additionally impose the individual rationality
constraint. See Section 3.4.
9Note that (LR) is increasing in α if α < 3−2q1−2q04−2q1−2q0 .
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Proposition 3. The optimal wage scheme under loss aversion is to pay a wage w(α∗) > 0
with probability one when an agent’s performance is high and with probability α∗ when his
performance is low. The optimal compensation rate α∗ is determined by:
α∗ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 1
η(λ−1) ≥ (2− q0 − q1)(1 + q1)− 1,
1
1−q1
(√
1−
[
1 + 1
η(λ−1)
]
· 1−q1
2−q0−q1 − q1
)
if 1
η(λ−1) < (2− q0 − q1)(1 + q1)− 1.
Proposition 3 shows that even when the agent fails in his project the principal may pay
the same amount of wage as the agent succeeds. If the loss-reducing eﬀect outweighs the
standard-incentive eﬀect in (CPE-IC’), then the stochastic compensation becomes optimal.
The optimal compensation probability is increasing in η(λ− 1): the principal is more likely
to adopt the stochastic compensation as the agent is more loss averse. Also, the principal
increases the compensation rate, as it is harder for the agent to accomplish his project when
he shirks (q0 decreases).
Note that two of our results—that binary payment schemes are optimal and that com-
pensating for the failure can be optimal if λ is not small—come from the insights of Herweg,
Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010). They show that without the limited liability constraint and
with the individual rationality constraint, the optimal compensation rate α∗ is either zero
(no compensation for the failure) or arbitrarily close to one (full compensation for the fail-
ure). The logic of their result is that the principal can decrease the agent’s expected loss
by increasing the compensation rate and decreasing the base wage, without violating both
the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. Although their logic is
important, two sensitive issues arise. First, the optimal compensation rate in their model
approaches one, and hence the optimal contract is not well-deﬁned. Second, more impor-
tantly, a base wage goes to negative inﬁnity in their optimal contract. In contrast, we impose
the limited liability constraints to focus on the eﬀect of loss aversion on (CPE-IC’), and shed
light on the trade-oﬀ between the standard-incentive eﬀect and loss-reducing eﬀect. By this
trade-oﬀ, the principal adopts a stochastic compensation even when the individual ratio-
nality constraint does not bind.10 This is because stochastic compensation for the failure
encourages the loss-averse agent to work hard even though it makes the agents more likely
to shirk if they are loss-neutral.
10Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) mention that if the agent is subjected to limited liability, then
the optimal compensation probability may be well deﬁned.
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3.3 The Eﬀect of Loss Aversion on the Principal’s Payment
This subsection discusses how the degree of loss aversion aﬀects the principal’s expected
payment in the optimal contract. Notice that if 1
η(λ−1) ≥ (2− q0 − q1)(1 + q1)− 1, then the
optimal compensation rate is α∗ = 0, and hence the principal’s expected payment is:
W0 ≡ q1d
Δq[1− (1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)] .
If q1 + q0 < 1, the expected payment increases as the degree of loss aversion increases. More
interestingly, if q1 + q0 > 1, the expected payment decreases as the degree of loss aversion
increases so that the principal may decide to hire a loss-averse agent rather than a loss-
neutral agent. The comparative statics of the latter case sharply contrasts with that of the
concave-utility case. The intuition is simple: if the probability of success is high, then a
loss-averse agent works harder than a loss-neutral agent because a loss-averse agent has a
much stronger incentive to minimize his expected loss.
Similarly, if 1
η(λ−1) < (2−q0−q1)(1+q1)−1, then by the envelope theorem the principal’s
expected payment is decreasing in η(λ− 1) if and only if:
1− (1− α∗)(2− q1 − q0) > 0.
As in the case α∗ = 0, if the probabilities of success in the project are not small, then the
expected payment can decrease as the degree of loss aversion increases.
3.4 The Optimal Wage Scheme with the Individual Rationality
Constraint
This subsection examines the robustness of Proposition 3 by additionally imposing the indi-
vidual rationality (IR) constraint. Suppose that in addition to the above setting, each agent
does not accept the contract if his overall utility is less than his reservation utility u¯ ∈ R.
In the Appendix, we show that Lemma 1 holds even when the IR constraint is binding.
Particularly, a binary payment scheme is still optimal in the optimal contract because we
can reduce the principal’s problem to a linear programming. However, wL may be not equal
to zero in this case. The CPE constraint also binds in the optimal contract; otherwise, the
principal oﬀers a ﬂat-wage contract. As a result, IR constraint can be written as:
[q1 + α(1− q1)] [1− (1− α)(1− q1)η(λ− 1)]w(α) + wL ≥ d. (IR)
In the proof, we show that there exists α ∈ [0, 1) that satisﬁes (IR) with equality. Deﬁne
the value of α that satisﬁes (IR) with equality by αIR if αIR is unique. If it is not unique,
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then deﬁne the value of α that minimizes the principal’s expected payment among such
values by αIR. In the proof, we constructively show how to ﬁnd this value. We characterize
the optimal wage schemes as follows:
Proposition 4. In the optimal wage scheme, a principal pays w(α∗∗) > 0 with probability
one when an agent’s performance is high, whereas she pays w(α∗∗) > 0 with probability
α∗∗ and wL < w(α∗∗) with probability 1 − α∗∗ when his performance is low. The optimal
compensation rate α∗∗ is determined by α∗∗ = max
{
α∗, αIR
}
. Also, wL = 0 if α
∗∗ > 0.
Proposition 4 shows that even when we take the IR constraint into account, the main prop-
erties of the optimal contract in Proposition 3 are still valid: the agent always receives a high
wage if his performance is high, whereas he stochastically receives the high wage if his per-
formance is low. This result contrasts with that of Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010):
when η(λ − 1) > 1, the agent receives a high wage almost surely even if his performance is
low; otherwise, the agent never receives a high wage if his performance is low. In addition,
we show that when the principal uses a stochastic compensation scheme (α∗∗ > 0), the LL
constraint always binds (wL = 0) irrespective of the level of the agent’s reservation wage.
This result highlights the importance of taking the LL constraint into account under agent
loss aversion.
When u¯ = 0, we obtain the following result:
Corollary 1. Suppose u¯ = 0. Then, wL = 0 for all parameters. The optimal compensation
rate α∗∗ is determined by
α∗∗ = max
{
α∗, 1− 1
(1− q0)η(λ− 1)
}
.
Figure 1 describes the optimal compensation rates α∗∗ when q0 = 0.1. When the degree
of loss aversion is modest such that η(λ− 1) = 1, the IR constraint never binds. Then, the
trade-oﬀ between the standard-incentive eﬀect and the loss-reducing eﬀect on the CPE-IC
constraint determines the optimal compensation rate. The principal adopts a stochastic
compensation scheme if q1 takes middle values (the thick line in Figure 2). As the degree
of loss aversion increases, however, the IR constraint is more likely to bind in the optimal
contract. When η(λ − 1) = 1.5, the principal adopts a stochastic compensation scheme for
any q1, and the IR constraint binds in the optimal contract if and only if q1 ≥ 0.55 (the thin
line in Figure 1). When the degree of loss aversion becomes large such that η(λ − 1) = 2,
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Figure 1: The optimal compensation rates when u¯ = 0 and q0 = 0.1. Thick line when
η(λ− 1) = 1, Thin line when η(λ− 1) = 1.5, Dashed line when η(λ− 1) = 2.
the IR constraint always binds, and hence the optimal compensation rate does not depend
on q1 (the dashed line in Figure 1). In summary, the IR constraint becomes relevant for
determining the optimal wage scheme if the degree of loss aversion is large.
Finally, Proposition 4 has an implication on executive compensation. As Murphy (1999)
summarizes, most stock options do not adjust for market-wide common shocks, and there
is little empirical evidence of relative performance evaluation in executive compensation.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) ﬁnd that executives are often paid for luck.11 Importantly,
Garvey and Milbourn (2006) highlight that executives are rewarded for good luck but do not
suﬀer from bad luck. Proposition 4 implies if an executive is loss averse, then his wage is not
sensitive to his performance when the proﬁts are high; on the other hand, the executive’s
wage depends on his performance when the proﬁts are low. This result gives an insight into
why stock options are widely used as executive compensation even though the stock options
do not remove industry-wide shocks.
3.5 Loss Aversion and Concave Consumption Utility
This subsection brieﬂy discusses the case in which the agent has concave consumption utility
as well as gain-loss utility. Suppose that the agent is both risk and loss averse. Even in this
case, stochastic compensation can still reduce the agent’s expected losses and encourage
him to work hard by stochastically compensating for his failure. However, the optimal
wage scheme may not be binary under concave consumption utility. When the agent has
linear consumption utility, the principal pays the same amount of wage for low performance
11Oyer (2004) shows such “pay for luck” can be an optimal contract when a manager’s reservation utility
is market-sensitive.
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stochastically as that for high performance in order to reduce the agent’s expected loss.
When the agent has concave consumption utility, such a wage scheme may be too costly
for the principal. In this case, the wage when the agent fails in the project and when the
principal compensates for it may be less than that when he succeeds in the project. If the
degree of loss aversion is more crucial than the concavity of the intrinsic utility, the principal
still adopts a binary payment scheme to reduce the agent’s expected loss in gain-loss utility.12
4 Multi-Agent Moral Hazard and Team Incentives
This section examines team-based incentive schemes as an application of stochastic com-
pensation. We ﬁrst discuss when the principal ties her employees’ wages to the company’s
proﬁts. We then analyze the optimal wage schemes when the principal can hire only two
agents and ties an agent’s wage to the other agent’s performance.
4.1 The Many-Agent Moral-Hazard Model
So far, we have assumed that the principal can credibly commit to any lottery. How the prin-
cipal can commit to such stochastic compensation, however, is an important issue in practice.
For example, if the lottery used for the stochastic compensation is not veriﬁable, then the
principal cannot commit to pay according to the result of the lottery. This casts doubt on
the credibility of stochastic compensation schemes. Indeed, such stochastic compensation
does not seem prevalent in practice.13
Even in this case, the principal can credibly commit to team-based incentive schemes: an
agent’s wage depends not only on his own performance but also others’ performance. Suppose
that the principal hires suﬃciently many identical agents. Then, by the same derivation as
in Proposition 3, in an optimal contract, the principal pays a high wage to both high- and
low-performance agents if most agents (more than a fraction α∗ of all agents) accomplish
their projects; otherwise, she pays the high wage only to high-performance agents. This may
help explain why ﬁrms often use team-based incentive schemes (Chiappori and Salanie´ 2003;
Lazear and Oyer 2012). In particular, our results can explain why companies sometime pay
high wages not only to high-performance employees but also to low-performance employees
when the companies earn high proﬁts.
12Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) extensively discuss this issue.
13Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) also doubt the plausibility of a stochastic compensation:
“[r]estricting the principal to oﬀer nonstochastic wage payments is standard in the principal-agent liter-
ature and also in accordance with observed practice.”
16
In addition, if we take into account additional managerial aspects, then team-based
incentive schemes can be better than stochastic compensation in a single-agent case. For
example, suppose the principal faces a credit constraint. In a single-agent case, if the agent
fails in the project, then the principal may not be able to pay a high wage to the agent. On
the other hand, if the principal adopts a team-based incentive scheme, then she needs to
pay high wages to low-performance agents only when most agents succeed in their projects.
Because of the proﬁts from other agents’ high performance, the principal can pay high wages
to low-performance agents and hence she can adopt team incentives even under the credit
constraint.
4.2 The Two-Agent Moral-Hazard Model
In Section 4.1, we discussed how team incentives can be eﬀective to implement stochas-
tic compensation. To see the intuitions and properties of such team incentives more pre-
cisely, we examine a model in which the principal hires only two loss-averse agents instead
of using the outside lottery. The characteristic of a wage scheme is determined by how
each agent’s wage is related to his colleague’s performance. For agent i, a wage scheme
wi = (wiHH , w
i
HL, w
i
LH , w
i
LL) exhibits joint performance evaluation (JPE) if (w
i
HH , w
i
LH) >
(wiHL, w
i
LL): given an agent’s performance, his wage increases in his colleague’s perfor-
mance.14 A wage scheme exhibits relative performance evaluation (RPE) if (wiHH , w
i
LH) <
(wiHL, w
i
LL): given an agent’s performance, his wage decreases in his colleague’s performance.
Finally, if (wiHH , w
i
LH) = (w
i
HL, w
i
LL), a wage scheme exhibits independent performance eval-
uation (IPE): an agent’s wage does not depend on his colleague’s performance.
In the following analysis, we assume away negative-bonus wage schemes as in Assumption
1.
Assumption 2. wHH ≥ wLH and wHL ≥ wLL.
Assumption 2 holds for virtually any wage schemes in practice. Moreover, Assumption 2 is
justiﬁed if each agent can secretly dispose his output, as discussed in Section 3.15
14The inequality means weak inequality for each component and strict inequality for at least one compo-
nent.
15We can also characterize the optimal wage scheme under CPE without imposing Assumption 2. The
optimal contract does not change when η(λ− 1) ≤ 1, but unlike in Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010)
our optimal contract is well-deﬁned even when η(λ− 1) > 1. If Assumption 2 is not imposed and the degree
of loss aversion is suﬃciently large, then the negative bonuses can be adopted if q0 is small and if q1 is either
very large or very small. The full characterization is available upon request.
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By Assumption 2, the smallest possible wage is either wLH or wLL. First, if the smallest
wage is strictly positive, then the principal can reduce the payment without changing the
CPE-IC constraint by decreasing the same amount of money from each wage. Thus, the
smallest wage must be zero in the optimal contract. Second, due to loss aversion the agent
is less willing to work hard if he faces wage uncertainty when he succeeds in his own project.
Hence if wHH = wHL, then the principal can encourage him to work hard by reducing the
wage variation when he succeeds. Therefore, we have the following properties of the optimal
wage scheme.
Lemma 2. The optimal wage schemes under CPE satisfy (i) min{wLH , wLL} = 0 and (ii)
wHH = wHL.
Lemma 2 implies that team incentives in our model would have diﬀerent forms from those in
the existing literature like Itoh (1991), Che and Yoo (2001), and Kvaløy and Olsen (2006),
which show the optimality of team incentives. These studies ﬁnd that the agent’s wage is
zero regardless of his colleague’s outcome when he fails (wLH = wLL = 0), whereas his wage
may depend on his colleague’s outcome when he succeeds. In contrast, Lemma 2 implies
that under loss aversion team incentives become only relevant when the agent fails in his
own project: either wLH or wLL can be positive whereas wHH = wHL. In what follows, we
denote by wHH = wHL ≡ w.
By Lemma 2 and Assumption 2, we have two possible types of wage schemes: (i) w ≥
wLH ≥ wLL = 0 and (ii) w ≥ wLL ≥ wLH = 0. We examine the optimal wage scheme in
each case. Then, we compare these two cases and derive the optimal wage scheme.
First, we examine case (i): w ≥ wLH ≥ wLL = 0. The principal’s problem is to minimize
her expected payment given that each agent works:
min
w,wLH
q1w + q1(1− q1)wLH
subject to
q1w + q1(1− q1)wLH − d− η(λ− 1)
[
q1(1− q1)2w + q1(1− q1)3wLH + q21(1− q1)(w − wLH)
]
≥ q0w + q1(1− q0)wLH − η(λ− 1)
[
q0(1− q0)(1− q1)w + q1(1− q0)2(1− q1)wLH
+ q0q1(1− q0)(w − wLH)
]
, (CPEJ)
w ≥ 0 and wLH ∈ [0, w], (LLJ)
where (CPEJ) is the CPE-IC constraint and (LLJ) is the limited liability constraint in this
case.
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Note that (CPEJ) can be rewritten as:
[1− (1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)]w
+
[ −q1︸︷︷︸
(SI)
+ q1(1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(LR1)
+ q1(1− q1)(2− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(LR2)
]
wLH ≥ d
Δq
.
There are three eﬀects for increasing wLH . We call the eﬀect of (SI) the standard-incentive
eﬀect, and the eﬀects of (LR1) and (LR2) the loss-reducing eﬀect. (SI) comes from the
intrinsic utility: increasing wLH reduces the incentive to work hard. (LR1) comes from
the gain-loss utility comparing wLH with w. This means increasing wLH encourages the
agent to work hard because it reduces wage uncertainty when working, provided q1 + q0 <
1. (LR2) comes from the gain-loss utility comparing wLH with wLL. This implies that
increasing wLH encourages the agent to work hard because it adds wage uncertainty when
shirking. Notice that (SI) does not depend on η, λ, while the eﬀects of (LR1) and (LR2)
increase as η or λ increases. Hence, in contrast to a classical concave utility, if the agent
is suﬃciently loss averse he is more likely to work hard when his wage depends on the
other’s performance (wLH > wLL = 0) than when his wage does not (wLH = wLL = 0).
The loss-reducing eﬀect becomes more crucial than the standard-incentive eﬀect if ΩJ ≡
[1− q1 − q0 + q1(1− q1)(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ − 1) ≥ 1; hence the principal prefers wLH > 0
rather than wLH = 0 if and only if ΩJ ≥ 1.
The analysis and the trade-oﬀ between the standard-incentive eﬀect and the loss-reducing
eﬀect are similar in the case of (ii): w ≥ wLL ≥ wLH = 0. The principal prefers wLL > 0
rather than wLL = 0 if and only if ΩR ≡ [1− q1 − q0 + q21(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1) ≥ 1.
Finally, we compare two cases to derive the optimal wage schemes. If both ΩJ < 1 and
ΩR < 1 hold, then IPE is optimal. Otherwise, team incentives become optimal and the
comparison of expected payments determines either JPE or RPE is optimal. By comparing
the expected payments under JPE with those under RPE, the cut-oﬀ point is given that
ΩJR ≡ [(1− q1 − q0)− q1(1− q1)2(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ − 1) is equal to one. When ΩJ ≥ ΩR,
JPE is optimal if ΩJR ≤ 1; otherwise RPE is optimal. When ΩJ < ΩR, JPE is optimal if
ΩJR ≥ 1; otherwise RPE is optimal. As a result, we have a full characterization of optimal
wage schemes:
Proposition 5. In a two-agent model, the optimal wage scheme is:
1. wI = (wI , wI , 0, 0) where wI = d
Δq [1−(1−q1−q0)η(λ−1)] if both ΩJ < 1 and ΩR < 1 hold.
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2. wJ = (wJ , wJ , wJ , 0) where wJ ≡ d
Δq(1−q1){1−[1−q1−q0−q1(2−q1−q0)]η(λ−1)} if one of the
following conditions holds; (i) q1 ≤ 12 and ΩR < 1 ≤ ΩJ , (ii) q1 ≤ 12 and ΩJR ≤ 1 ≤
ΩR ≤ ΩJ , or (iii) q1 > 12 and 1 ≤ ΩJR < ΩJ < ΩR.
3. wR = (wR, wR, 0, wR) where wR = d
Δqq1{1−[1−q1−q0−(1−q1)(2−q1−q0)]η(λ−1)} if one of the
following conditions holds; (i) q1 ≤ 12 and 1 < ΩJR < ΩR ≤ ΩJ , (ii) q1 > 12 and
ΩJ < 1 ≤ ΩR, or (iii) q1 > 12 and ΩJR < 1 ≤ ΩJ < ΩR.
As we described above, the optimal wage schemes depend on the trade-oﬀ between the
standard-incentive eﬀect and the loss-reducing eﬀect. In the intrinsic utility, the agent is less
willing to work under team incentives than under IPE because he receives same wage with
positive probability even when he fails. In the gain-loss utility, however, he is more willing
to work under team incentives than under IPE because it reduces his wage uncertainty
when working and increases his wage uncertainty when shirking. Proposition 5 provides
the following insights on team incentives. First, team incentives become optimal only when
q0 < 0.648. When q0 is large, the agent is very likely to succeed in his project even if he shirks.
In other words, his expected loss becomes small even if he shirks. Then, compensating for
his failure by team incentives is not optimal for the principal because the standard-incentive
eﬀect becomes more crucial than the loss-reducing eﬀect. Consequently, team incentives are
not optimal when q0 is large. Second, when the degree of loss aversion is moderate, i.e.
η(λ− 1) ≤ 1, the optimal wage scheme exhibits either IPE or JPE.16 As a typical example,
Figure 1 represents the optimal contracts when the degree of loss aversion is moderate such
that η = 1 and λ = 2. As q0 and q1 decrease, the agent’s wage uncertainty under working
compared to under shirking becomes large, and the agents are less likely to work hard under
IPE. Then, the principal’s incentive to compensate for the agents’ failure increases. As a
result, JPE becomes optimal if q1 is small.
The result that JPE can be optimal even when η(λ − 1) ≤ 1 and the principal can hire
only two agents is worth emphasizing.17 This result means that even when the agent does
not have large loss-aversion sensitivities and the principal can induce their eﬀorts under IPE,
adopting JPE may be still better than IPE. This is because we highlight the loss-reducing
eﬀects of the CPE-IC constraint on the optimal wage schemes by assuming the limited
16Some theoretical literature which analyzes reference-dependent preferences imposes η(λ − 1) ≤ 1 as an
assumption. See, for example, Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010) or Herweg and Mierendorﬀ (2013).
17The condition η(λ − 1) ≤ 1 corresponds with the “no dominance of gain-loss utility” assumption in
Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010). In their Proposition 7, they show that if the assumption is satisﬁed,
then the stochastic compensation for the agent’s own failure is not optimal.
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Figure 2: The optimal wage schemes when η = 1 and λ = 2. The region of each contract
scheme which is optimal under CPE is shown by: IPE=White, JPE=Gray.
liability constraint, and the eﬀects can outweigh the standard-incentive eﬀect even when the
degree of loss aversion is moderate.
Last but not least, notice that this model does not shed light on the aspects which
constitute team production; our model has no common noise, no production externalities,
no activities among agents such as help, sabotage or mutual monitoring. In this sense, this
model diﬀers from the existing literature on team incentives. However, our results indicate
that even if we do not explicitly incorporate such aspects of team production, forming teams
and introducing team incentives may be beneﬁcial for managers. It helps to understand why
teams and team incentives are ubiquitous even when some workplaces do not seem to have
the above aspects of team production.
4.3 JPE as a Team Equilibrium
So far, we have considered the CPE-IC condition in which (ai, aj) = (1, 1) is a Nash equi-
librium for the agents. When the agents could communicate before choosing their actions,
however, it would be possible to act coordinately and jointly deviate from (ai, aj) = (1, 1).
We now examine whether (ai, aj) = (1, 1) yields a higher joint utility in teams rather than
other eﬀort pairs. If (ai, aj) = (1, 1) yields the highest joint payoﬀs, the agents have no
incentives to jointly deviate from (ai, aj) = (1, 1).
Following Che and Yoo (2001), we call an action pair (ai, aj) a team equilibrium if it
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attains the highest joint utility in team under the wage scheme wJ = (wJ , wJ , wJ , 0) in
Proposition 5. The next proposition states that (ai, aj) = (1, 1) is a team equilibrium if the
condition
1− [1− q1 − q0 − q0(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1) > 0 (3)
holds.
Proposition 6. Suppose (3) is satisﬁed. Then, (ai, aj) = (1, 1) is a unique team equilibrium.
Proposition 6 implies that even though (ai, aj) = (0, 0) can also be a Nash equilibrium, it
gives lower total utility to the agents and hence is less plausible than (ai, aj) = (1, 1). In the
proof, we also show that there is no equilibrium such that one agent works and the other
agent shirks.18 Notice that (3) is always satisﬁed when η(λ− 1) ≤ 1. Thus, (ai, aj) = (1, 1)
is supported as a unique team equilibrium in Figure 1 for all regions where wJ is the optimal
wage scheme.
5 Conclusion
We investigate a moral hazard model with limited liability in which the agents have expectation-
based reference-dependent preferences a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We highlight a
trade-oﬀ between the standard-incentive eﬀect and the loss-reducing eﬀect on the agent’s in-
centive compatibility constraint, and show the optimality of stochastic compensation schemes
under agent loss aversion.
We also examine a multi-agent model and show that team incentives can be used for the
loss-reducing device. Our result may help understand why teams and team incentives are
ubiquitous in workplace, and team incentives as compensating for the agent’s failure may
help explain incentive schemes in practice.
18With a continuous eﬀort choice, under JPE there might exist a team equilibrium in which one agent
works very hard and the other agent does not work at all. When the eﬀort cost function is suﬃciently
convex, however, such an action pair does not become a team equilibrium. This is because by choosing the
same level of eﬀorts, the agents can save the total eﬀort cost as keeping the probability of getting high wages
constant.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In the text.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Immediate from (2).
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For notational convenience, let qHa = qa and q
L
a = (1 − qa) where a ∈ {0, 1}. The
principal’s problem is:
min
{wQn}
N∑
n=1
pn[q1wHn + (1− q1)wLn]
s.t.
N∑
n=1
pn[q1wHn + (1− q1)wLn]
− 1
2
∑
Q∈{H,L}
∑
Qˆ∈{H,L}
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
qQ1 q
Qˆ
1 pnpmη(λ− 1) · |wQn − wQˆm| − d
≥
N∑
n=1
pn[q0wHn + (1− q0)wLn]
− 1
2
∑
Q∈{H,L}
∑
Qˆ∈{H,L}
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
qQ0 q
Qˆ
0 pnpmη(λ− 1) · |wQn − wQˆm|, (4)
∀Q ∀n wQn ≥ 0, ∀Q ∀n ∀n′ ≤ n wQn ≥ wQn′ , ∀n wHn ≥ wLn.
(4) can be written as:
(q1 − q0)
N∑
n=1
pn(wHn − wLn)
−1
2
∑
Q∈{H,L}
∑
Qˆ∈{H,L}
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
(qQ1 q
Qˆ
1 − qQ0 qQˆ0 )pnpmη(λ− 1) · |wQn − wQˆm| ≥ d. (5)
(i) Take the following binary lottery: N = 2 and p1 = p2 = 1/2. Consider the following
wage scheme such that the agent receives a positive wage for sure if he succeeds in the
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project, and he receives the positive wage w > 0 with probability 1/2 if he fails:
wQn =
{
0 if Q = L and n = 1,
w otherwise.
The wage scheme obviously satisﬁes the LL constraints. Since the agent can receive
w > 0 with probability q1 + (1 − q1)/2 = (1 + q1)/2 if he works and with probability
q0 + (1− q0)/2 = (1 + q0)/2 if he shirks, (5) becomes
(q1 − q0)1
2
w −
[
1 + q1
2
(
1− 1 + q1
2
)
− 1 + q0
2
(
1− 1 + q0
2
)]
η(λ− 1)w ≥ d
⇔ w ≥ 2d
Δq[1 + η(λ− 1)(q0 + q1)] .
Hence, the principal can induce the agent to exert high eﬀort by setting suﬃciently large
w > 0.
(ii) We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that there exists s and t > s such that
wHt = wHs in the optimal wage scheme w. Since wHt ≥ wHs, we can set t = s + 1 without
loss of generality. We also set wHs+1 = wHN ; otherwise we can take another pair of wages
which contains the highest wage.
Because wHs ≥ wHn and wHn ≥ wLn for any n ≤ s, wHs ≥ wLn holds. This implies that
if wLn satisfying wHs+1 > wLn > wHs exists, then n > s must hold. Let l ≥ s+ 1 and h ≥ l
denote the lowest number and the highest number of n that satisﬁes wHs+1 > wLn > wHs,
respectively. Deﬁne
∑h
n=l pn = 0 if there does not exist n such that wHs+1 > wLn > wHs.
First, consider a new contract w′ with Δw > 0 that replaces wHs and wHs+1 of w to
w′Hs = wHs + ps+1Δw and w
′
Hs+1 = w
′
Hs+1 − psΔw, respectively. All elements of w′ satisfy
the LL constraints and it has the same ordinal position as the original contract. Then, the
diﬀerence between the new contract and the original one for the left hand side of (5) is:
(q21 − q20)(ps + ps+1)psps+1η(λ− 1)Δw + 2 [q1(1− q1)− q0(1− q0)] (
h∑
n=l
pn)psps+1η(λ− 1)Δw
=
[
(q1 + q0)(ps + ps+1) + 2(1− q1 − q0)(
h∑
n=l
pn)
]
(q1 − q0)psps+1η(λ− 1)Δw. (6)
Notice that (6) is strictly positive if either ps + ps+1 ≥
∑h
n=l pn or 1 − q1 − q0 ≥ 0 holds.
In these cases, the principal can relax (5) without violating the LL constraints. Because an
expected payment under the new contract is the same as under the original contract, the
principal can decrease the expected payment. A contradiction.
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Second, suppose that both ps+ ps+1 <
∑h
n=l pn and (1− q1− q0) < 0 hold. Then, we can
take Δw > 0 such that a new contract that changes the wages from the original contract to
w′Hs+1 = wHs+1 − (1 − q1)phΔw and w′Lh = wLh + q1ps+1Δw, satisfying the LL constraints
and has the same ordinal position as the original contract.
Then, the diﬀerence between the new contract and the original one for the left hand side
of (5) is:
{
(q21 − q20)(1− q1)ps+1(1− ps+1)ph︸ ︷︷ ︸
Comparing w′Hs+1 with {w′Hn}Nn=1
+ [q1(1− q1)− q0(1− q0)](1− q1)ps+1ph(1− ph)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Comparing w′Hs+1 with {w′Ln}Nn=1
− [q1(1− q1)− q0(1− q0)]q1ps+1(1− ps+1)ph︸ ︷︷ ︸
Comparing w′Lh with {w′Hn}Nn=1
− [(1− q1)2 − (1− q0)2]q1ps+1ph(1− ph)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Comparing w′Lh with {w′Ln}Nn=1
+ [q1(1− q1)− q0(1− q0)]ps+1ph[q1ps+1 + (1− q1)ph]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Comparing w′Hs+1 with w
′
Lh
}
η(λ− 1)Δw
=
{
[(q1 + q0)(1− ps+1) + (1− q0 − q1)ph](1− q1) + (1− q0)(1− ph)
− q1(1− q0 − q1)(1− 2ps+1)
}
(q1 − q0)ps+1phη(λ− 1)Δw. (7)
Notice that 1− q1− q0 < 0 implies (q1+ q0)(1− ps+1)+ (1− q0− q1)ph > (1− ps+1)− ph > 0,
and ps + ps+1 <
∑h
n=l pn implies ps+1 <
1
2
. Hence (7) is strictly positive, and the principal
can relax (5) without violating the LL constraints. Because an expected payment under
the new contract is the same as under the original contract, the principal can decrease the
expected payment—a contradiction.
Let wHn = w where n ∈ {1, · · · , N}. If w = 0, then all wages must be zero because
wHn ≥ wLn and the contract does not satisfy (5). Therefore, w > 0 in the optimal contract.
(iii) Let b1 ≡ wL1 and bn ≡ wLn − wLn−1 for n ∈ {2, · · · , N}. Note that
∑N
n=1 pnwLn =∑N
n=1 p˜nbn where p˜n =
∑N−n
k=1 pN−k. Finally, set bN+1 = w −
∑N
n=1 bn.
25
Then, the principal’s problem can be written as:
min
{bn}N+1n=1
q1(bN+1 +
N∑
n=1
bn) + (1− q1)
N∑
n=1
p˜nbn
s.t. bN+1 +
N∑
n=1
bn −
N∑
n=1
p˜nbn
+
[
−(1− q1 − q0)
N∑
n=1
pn(bN+1 +
N∑
k=n+1
bn) + (2− q1 − q0)
∑
n>m
pnpm(
m∑
k=n
bk)
]
η(λ− 1) = d
Δq
,
(8)
∀n ∈ {1, · · · , N + 1} bn ≥ 0.
This is a linear programming problem. Notice that (8) is a closed set. Because each coeﬃcient
of bn in the principal’s objective function is positive and each bn is bounded from below, there
existsK ∈ R++ such that for any n, bn > K is never optimal. Thus, without loss of generality
we can restrict the constraint set to bn ≤ K, which attains boundedness of the constraint
set. Thus, the problem has a solution.
As developed by Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk (2010), the solution of the linear pro-
gramming problem has an extreme point of the constraint, and it is generically unique. The
unique solution satisﬁes that bn > 0 holds for one of n ∈ {1, · · · , N + 1}, and bm = 0 holds
for any m = n. By the construction of bn, we have proven that the optimal wage scheme is
binary and generically unique.
Proof of Proposition 3
Notice that at the optimal wage scheme, (CPE-IC’) must hold with equality because oth-
erwise the principal can decrease w without violating constraints. Thus, the optimal wage
is determined by w(α) as in the text, subject to 1 + [1− (1− α)(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ − 1) >
0 ⇐⇒ α > 1 − 1
2−q1−q0
[
1 + 1
η(λ−1)
]
. Note that (CPE-IC’) is never satisﬁed when α ≤
1− 1
2−q1−q0
[
1 + 1
η(λ−1)
]
.
By substituting w(α) into the expected payment function, the principal’s problem be-
comes:
min
α∈[0,1]
Wα ≡ [q1 + α(1− q1)]d
Δq(1− α){1 + [1− (1− α)(2− q1 − q0)]η(λ− 1)} , (9)
subject to α > 1− 1
2−q1−q0
[
1 + 1
η(λ−1)
]
.
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Because (9) is continuously diﬀerentiable for all α ∈
(
1− 1
2−q1−q0 [1 +
1
η(λ−1) ], 1
)
, the
solution satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition:
dWα
dα
=
d
Δq
1 + [1− (2− q1 − q0)(1 + q1) + 2αq1(2− q1 − q0) + α2(1− q1)(2− q1 − q0)]η(λ− 1)
(1− α)2{1 + [1− (1− α)(2− q1 − q0)]η(λ− 1)}2
≥ 0, (10)
which holds with equality if α∗ > 0.
By solving (10), we get the candidate of the optimal compensation rate α∗ as in the
statement. Because the numerator of (10) is increasing in α, (10) is also a suﬃcient condition.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First, we check Lemma 1 holds even when the IR constraint is additionally imposed.
Lemma 1 (i) holds, because once we have a contract satisfying the other constraints, then
the IR constraint is satisﬁed by increasing all of the wages at the same amount.
Lemma 1 (ii) holds because the both alternative contracts relax the IR constraint. First,
suppose that we take a new contract w′ with Δw > 0 which changes wHs and wHs+1 in w to
w′Hs = wHs+ps+1Δw and w
′
Hs+1 = wHs+1−psΔw, respectively. Then, the diﬀerence between
the new contract and the original one of the agent’s total utility is:
q21(ps + ps+1)psps+1η(λ− 1)Δw > 0.
Next, suppose that we take a new contract which changes the wages from the original contract
to w′Hs+1 = wHs+1− (1− q1)phΔw and w′Lh = wLh+ q1ps+1Δw. Then, the diﬀerence between
the new contract and the original one of the agent’s total utility is:
q1(1− q1)ps+1ph [q1ps+1 + (1− q1)ph] η(λ− 1)Δw > 0.
Thus, in each case the IR constraint is relaxed.
To check Lemma 1 (iii), notice that (5) always binds in the optimal contract; otherwise
the principal oﬀers a ﬂat-wage contract. The principal’s problem in this case is:
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min
{bn}N+1n=1
q1(bN+1 +
N∑
n=1
bn) + (1− q1)
N∑
n=1
p˜nbn
s.t. bN+1 +
N∑
n=1
bn −
N∑
n=1
p˜nbn
+
[
− (1− q1 − q0)
N∑
n=1
pn(bN+1 +
N∑
k=n+1
bn) + (2− q1 − q0)
∑
n>m
pnpm(
m∑
k=n
bk)
]
η(λ− 1) = d
Δq
,
q1(bN+1 +
N∑
n=1
bn) + (1− q1)
N∑
n=1
p˜nbn
−
[
q1(1− q1)
N∑
n=1
pn(bN+1 +
N∑
k=n+1
bn) + (1− q1)2
∑
n>m
pnpm(
m∑
k=n
bk)
]
η(λ− 1) ≥ d, (11)
∀n ∈ {1, · · · , N + 1} bn ≥ 0.
If (11) does not bind in the optimal contract, then the proof of Lemma 1 (iii) can be
directly applied. Suppose (11) binds in the optimal contract. Then, by solving (11) for
b1 and substituting it into the objective function, the principal’s problem becomes a linear
programming problem with one equality constraint and non-negative constraints. Thus, the
optimal wage scheme is binary and generically unique by the similar logic with the proof of
Lemma 1. Set b1 = wL.
We now characterize the optimal contract. The IR constraint becomes:
wL + [q1 + α(1− q1)] [1− (1− α)(1− q1)η(λ− 1)]w(α) ≥ d+ u¯. (12)
If (12) does not bind, the analysis is just same with the proof of Proposition 3 and hence
α = α∗. We investigate the case of which (12) binds. We ﬁrst prove α > 0 implies wL = 0 by
contradiction. Suppose instead α > 0 and wL > 0 in the optimal contract. Substituting (12)
with equality and w(α) into the objective function and ignoring the LL constraint wL ≥ 0,
the principal’s problem becomes:
min
α∈[0,1]
[q1 + α(1− q1)] (1− q1)η(λ− 1)d
Δq {1 + [1− (1− α)(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)} + d+ u¯. (13)
The ﬁrst-order derivative of (13) is negative if and only if η(λ − 1) > 1−q1
1−q0 . Hence, in the
optimal contract the principal chooses either α = 0 or α → 1. The base wage wL, however,
goes to negative inﬁnity as α goes to one—a contradiction. Thus, if α > 0 holds in the
optimal contract, then the LL constraint binds.
28
By substituting the value of w(α) and wL = 0 into (12), we have:
[q1 + α(1− q1)] [1− (1− α)(1− q1)η(λ− 1)]
(q1 − q0)(1− α) {1 + [1− (1− α)(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)} ≥
d+ u¯
d
(14)
Note that the left hand side of (14) goes to inﬁnity as α → 1. Hence, for any parameters
there exists α ∈ [0, 1) which satisﬁes (14) with equality.
In general, there exist multiple α which satisﬁes (14) with equality. In such a case, the
principal chooses α which minimizes her expected payment. Because the numerator of (10) is
increasing in α, the principal’s expected payment is decreasing in α < α∗ and is increasing in
α > α∗. Let αl denote the highest α < α∗ which satisﬁes (14) with equality. Similarly, let αh
denote the lowest α > α∗ which satisﬁes (14) with equality. Then, the optimal compensation
rate is determined as:
αIR ≡ argminα∈{αh,αl}Wα.
Note that αIR is well-deﬁned for all parameters.
Proof of Corollary 1
We ﬁrst prove wL = 0 by contradiction. Suppose wL > 0 in the optimal contract. Then, (12)
binds because otherwise the principal can decrease both w(α) and wL by a same amount.
In this case, (12) holds with α = α∗ and wL = 0 if and only if η(λ − 1) ≤ 1/(1 − q0). he
principal prefers such a wage scheme. Since the principal chooses wL > 0 in the optimal
contract, η(λ− 1) > 1/(1− q0) must hold. Then, the ﬁrst-order derivative of (13) is always
negative, the principal chooses α → 1, and the base wage wL goes to negative inﬁnity—a
contradiction.
When u¯ = 0, (14) becomes:
[α(1− q0) + q0] · [1− (1− α)(1− q0)η(λ− 1)] ≥ 0.
Because α(1− q0) + q0 > 0, the condition is equivalent to:
α ≥ 1− 1
(1− q0)η(λ− 1) .
Thus, αIR = 1− 1
(1−q0)η(λ−1) when u¯ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Notice that in the two-agent moral-hazard model, the CPE-IC condition can be rewritten as
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q1wHH + (1− q1)wHL − q1wLH − (1− q1)wLL
−q1(1− q1)(q1 + q0)η(λ− 1)|wHH − wHL| − q21(1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)|wHH − wLH |
−q1(1− q1)(1− q1 − q0)xη(λ− 1)|wHH − wLL| − q1(1− q1)(1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)|wHL − wLH |
−(1− q1)2(1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)|wHL − wLL|+ q1(1− q1)(2− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)|wLH − wLL|
≥ d
Δq
. (CPE’)
Proof. (i) We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that w = (wHH , wHL, wLH , wLL) which
satisﬁes min{wLH , wLL} > 0 is the optimal wage scheme. By Assumption 2, we can reduce
the same amount from each possible wage without violating the LL constraints. Also, re-
ducing the same amount from all payments does not aﬀect (CPE’). Thus, the principal can
decrease the expected payment. A contradiction.
(ii) We prove this by contradiction. Suppose w = (wHH , wHL, wLH , wLL) is the optimal
wage scheme.
Consider a case in which wHH > wHL. Then, we can take Δw > 0 such that a new
contract w = (wHH − (1 − q1)Δw, wHL + q1Δw, wLH , wLL) satisﬁes the LL constraints and
has the same ordinal position as the original contract.
First, suppose that wHH > wHL. If wHL ≥ wLH , the diﬀerence between the new contract
and the original contract for the left hand side of (CPE’) is:
C(w)− C(w) = q1(1− q1)(q1 + q0)η(λ− 1)Δw > 0.
where we denote the left hand side of (CPE’) as C(w′) when a wage scheme is w′. If
wHH > wLH > wHL, the diﬀerence between the new contract and the original contract for
the left hand side of (CPE’) is:
C(w)− C(w) =q1(1− q1)(q1 + q0)η(λ− 1)Δw + 2q21(1− q1)(1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)Δw
=q1(1− q1) [(1− q1)(q1 + q0) + q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)Δw
>0.
Thus, the principal can relax (CPE’) without violating the LL constraints. Because an
expected payment under the new contract is the same as under the original contract, the
principal can decrease the expected payment. A contradiction.
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Second, suppose that wHL < wLH = wHH . By (i) of this Lemma, wLL = 0 holds. The
left hand side of (CPE’) is:
C(w) =(1− q1) {1− [(1− q1 − q0)− q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)}wHL.
Because we suppose that w satisﬁes (CPE’), 1− [(1− q1 − q0)− q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ−1) > 0
must hold. Then we can take Δw > 0 such that a new contract w˜ = (wHH−(1−q1)Δw, wHL+
Δw, wLH − (1 − q1)Δw, wLL) satisﬁes the LL constraints and has the same ordinal position
as the original contract. The diﬀerence between the new contract and the original one for
the left hand side of (CPE’) is:
C(w˜)− C(w) =(1− q1) {1− [(1− q1 − q0)− q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)}Δw > 0.
Thus, the principal can relax (CPE’) without violating the LL constraints. Because an
expected payment under the new contract is the same as under the original contract, the
principal can decrease the expected payment. A contradiction.
We can prove this in the case where wHH < wHL in the same way except for taking w =
(wHH+(1−q1)Δw, wHL−q1Δw, wLH , wLL) or w˜ = (wHH+(1−q1)Δw, wHL−q21Δw, wLH , wLL−
q21Δw) as a new contract.
Proof of Proposition 5
First, consider the case of (i) w ≥ wLH ≥ wLL = 0. Suppose that 1−(1−q1−q0)η(λ−1) > 0.
By substituting w which holds (CPEJ) with equality into the objective function, this problem
is reduced to:
min
wLH
[
1− q1(1− q1)(2− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)
1− (1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)
]
wLH
subject to
wLH ∈ [0, w].
If the coeﬃcient of wLH is positive, wLH should be zero. On the other hand, wLH should
be equal to w if the coeﬃcient of wLH is not positive. As a result, the optimal wLH is
presented by:
wLH =
{
0 if ΩJ < 1,
w if ΩJ ≥ 1,
where ΩJ ≡ [1− q1 − q0 + q1(1− q1)(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1).
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Next, suppose that 1−(1−q1−q0)η(λ−1) ≤ 0 < 1−[1− q1 − q0 − q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ−1).
Because the coeﬃcient of wLH is positive but that of w is negative, the solution exists and
wLH = w holds at the optimum.
Finally, suppose that 1− [1− q1 − q0 − q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1) ≤ 0. Then, the solution
does not exist.
As a result, if ΩJ < 1, the optimal wage scheme is w
I = (wI , wI , 0, 0) where
wI =
d
Δq[1− (1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)] ,
and the expected wage is:
W I = q1
d
Δq[1− (1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)] . (IPE)
If ΩJ > 1 and 1− [1− q1 − q0 − q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1) > 0, the solution in this case is
wJ = (wJ , wJ , wJ , 0) where
wJ ≡ d
Δq(1− q1) {1− [1− q1 − q0 − q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)} ,
and the expected wage is:
W J = q1(2− q1) d
Δq(1− q1) {1− [1− q1 − q0 − q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)} . (JPE)
If 1− [1− q1 − q0 − q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1) ≤ 0, the solution does not exist in this case.
This result can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 3. Suppose that w ≥ wLH ≥ wLL = 0. The solution exists if and only if
1− [1− q1 − q0 − q1(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1) > 0. If it does exist, the optimal wage scheme is
wI = (wI , wI , 0, 0) if ΩJ < 1, and w
J = (wJ , wJ , wJ , 0) if ΩJ ≥ 1.
Second, we examine the case of (ii) w ≥ wLL ≥ wLH = 0. The principal’s problem is as
follows:
min
w,wLL
q1w + (1− q1)2wLL
subject to
[1− (1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)]w
+ [−(1− q1) + (1− q1)(1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1) + q1(1− q1)(2− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)]wLL
≥ d
Δq
. (CPER)
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w ≥ 0, and wLL ∈ [0, w]. (LLR)
where (CPER) is the CPE-IC constraint and (LLR) is the limited liability constraint in this
case.
Suppose that 1− (1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1) > 0. By substituting w which holds (CPER) with
equality into the objective function, this problem is reduced to:
min
wLL
[
1− q
2
1(2− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)
1− (1− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)
]
wLL
subject to
wLL ∈ [0, w].
If the coeﬃcient of wLL is positive, wLL should be zero. On the other hand, wLL should
be equal to w if the coeﬃcient of wLL is not positive. The optimal wLH is presented by:
wLL =
{
0 if ΩR < 1,
w if ΩR ≥ 1,
where ΩR ≡ [1− q1 − q0 + q21(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1).
Next, suppose that 1−(1−q1−q0)η(λ−1) ≤ 0. Because the coeﬃcient of wLL is positive
but that of w is not positive, the solution exists and wLL = w holds at the optimum.
As a result, if ΩR < 1, the optimal contract in this case is w
I and the expected wage is
WI . On the other hand, if ΩR ≥ 1, the optimal contract is wR = (wR, wR, 0, wR) where
wR =
d
Δqq1 {1− [1− q1 − q0 − (1− q1)(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)} ,
and the expected wage is:
WR = (q21 − q1 + 1)
d
Δqq1 {1− [1− q1 − q0 − (1− q1)(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)} . (RPE)
Because 1− q1 − q0 − (1− q1)(2− q1 − q0) < 0, the solution always exists.
Hence, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose that w ≥ wLL ≥ wLH = 0. The solution always exists. The optimal
wage scheme is wI = (wI , wI , 0, 0) if ΩR < 1, and w
R = (wR, wR, 0, wR) if ΩR ≥ 1,
where wR = d
Δqq1{1−[1−q1−q0−(1−q1)(2−q1−q0)]η(λ−1)} .
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We now derive the optimal wage scheme from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. We have the
following relationship:
ΩJ  ΩR ⇔ 1
2
 q1.
When q1 ≤ 12 , we have the following possible cases: (I-1) ΩR ≤ ΩJ < 1, (I-2) ΩR < 1 ≤ ΩJ
and (I-3) 1 ≤ ΩR ≤ ΩJ .
First, in case (I-1), the optimal wage scheme is wI which exhibits IPE. Second, in case
(I-2), the optimal wage scheme is wJ which exhibits JPE. These results are easily derived
from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. Finally, in case (I-3), we should compare between WJ and
WR in order to determine the optimal wage scheme.
WJ < WR ⇔ (1− 2q1)
{
1− [1− q1 − q0 − q1(1− q1)2(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)} > 0. (15)
Because q1 ≤ 12 , we have:
WJ ≤ WR ⇔ ΩJR ≡
[
1− q1 − q0 − q1(1− q1)2(2− q1 − q0)
]
η(λ− 1) ≤ 1. (16)
Thus, when (I-3), the optimal wage scheme is wJ if (16) is satisﬁed; otherwise wR is the
optimal.
Next, when q1 >
1
2
, we have the following possible cases: (II-1) ΩJ < ΩR < 1, (II-2)
ΩJ < 1 ≤ ΩR and (II-3) 1 ≤ ΩJ < ΩR.
First, by Lemma 3 and 4, the optimal wage scheme is wI in case (II-1) while it is wR in
case (II-2). Next, in the case of (II-3), we should compare between WJ and WR in order to
determine the optimal wage scheme. By (15) and q1 >
1
2
, we have:
WR < WJ ⇔ ΩJR < 1. (17)
Thus, when (II-3), the optimal wage scheme is wR if (17) is satisﬁed; otherwise it is wJ .
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Because wJ is the optimal contract, the CPE-IC constraint holds with equality:
U(1, 1,wJ |1, 1, wˆJ) = U(0, 1,wJ |0, 1, wˆJ). Also, under the payment scheme wJ , the agent’s
probability of getting w when he works and his colleague shirks is equal to when he shirks and
his colleague works. Hence U(1, 0,wJ |1, 0, wˆJ) = U(0, 1,wJ |0, 1, wˆJ)−d < U(1, 1,wJ |1, 1, wˆJ).
Thus, neither (ai, aj) = (1, 0) nor (ai, aj) = (0, 1) gives the agents the highest joint utility
under the payment scheme wJ .
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Next, we show that each agent’s total utility when both agents work is higher than when
both agents shirk. The agent’s total utilities when (ai, aj) = (0, 1) and (ai, aj) = (0, 0) under
wJ are as follows:
U(0, 1,wJ |0, 1, wˆJ) = [1− (1− q1)(1− q0)]wJ − (1− q1)(1− q0) [1− (1− q1)(1− q0)] η(λ− 1)wJ ,
U(0, 0,wJ |0, 0, wˆJ) = [1− (1− q0)2]wJ − (1− q0)2 [1− (1− q0)2] η(λ− 1)wJ .
Because (3) implies
U(0, 1,wJ |0, 1, wˆJ)− U(0, 0,wJ |0, 0, wˆJ)
=Δq(1− q0) [1 + η(λ− 1)− (1− q0)(2− q1 − q0)η(λ− 1)]wJ
=Δq(1− q0) {1− [1− q1 − q0 − q0(2− q1 − q0)] η(λ− 1)}wJ
>0,
we have U(0, 0,wJ |0, 0, wˆJ) < U(0, 1,wJ |0, 1, wˆJ) = U(1, 1,wJ |1, 1, wˆJ).
Therefore, (ai, aj) = (1, 1) attains the agents the highest joint utility under the wage
scheme wJ .
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